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The literature available on the international debt crisis is enor-
mous. Numerous problems, solutions and suggestions have been
made. The literature available comes from the parties involved in the
issue and from outsiders as well. Many have attempted to diagnose
the cause and prescribe a cure for this worldwide financial catastro-
phe. Meanwhile, the borrowers and their economies have suffered
tremendous slowdowns while the lenders and their respective coun-
tries have coped successfully with the crisis. This difference occurred
in Latin America for example, because the economic policies imple-
mented by certain developed countries contributed in substantial part
to the inflation of the debt.
This article does not attempt to repeat or reformulate the eco-
nomic or legal propositions that have already been advanced on the
matter. Instead, using the debt problem as an example, it will illus-
trate that a State is responsible under international law, for the ad-
verse consequences abroad of its domestic policies. The Article will
bring together several legal propositions which permit the formula-
tion of a rule which is in the process of formation, and may be al-
ready recognized, in the hope that it will prevent future allocation of
burdens solely on the lesser developed countries.
This Article demonstrates the emergence of a duty to consider
the international consequences of domestic economic acts. This obli-
gation has a correlative right, that the affected States may request
due consideration by the State which is going to undertake the rele-
vant economic measures. These rights and duties arise both where
there is a breach of a duty and where there is damage as a conse-
quence of a lawful act even if there is no breach of a duty. The latter
basis for responsibility is based on the abuse of rights principle which
will be examined below.
It is extremely important to consider the debt problem in light
of respective rights and duties, because an open discussion of both is
fundamental to an equitable conclusion. As stated by S. Sathirathai,
an acceptable international economic order will not result if the
rights are separated from their inevitably corresponding duties.'
This analysis will begin to change the existing "rules of the game"
and permit the recognition of new rules that further the goals of de-
velopment and social justice.
The gap between the developed countries and the lesser devel-
oped countries has been widening in the last decade. Through the
1. Sathirathai, An Understanding of the Relationship Between International Legal Dis-
course and Third World States, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 409 (1984).
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development of rules of law that establish strict, logical norms of
conduct and sanctions for their transgression, it is feasible to achieve
an improved level of life for all. Although this analysis tries to re-
main within the traditional Western conception of international law,
certain formalities are too rigid and do not permit the necessary
evolution of the law. It is important, therefore, to appraise the argu-
ments presented in this Article with a flexible, rather than a rigid,
juridical point of view. The law is neither what the Western nor the
Southern nor the Soviet-Bloc coutries say it is. The law must be an
understanding and, up to a certain point, a compromise between the
different currents.
I. FACTS AND ISSUES REGARDING THE DEBT CRISIS
A. The Latin American Debt Problem
During the last decade many countries have been faced with a
very difficult economic situtation. Particularly in the 1980's, Latin
American countries have accumulated a huge outstanding foreign
debt.2 The problems of certain nations in meeting their obligations
have come to be known as the "debt crisis." This crisis affects not
only the debtor countries but also the home-states of the lenders.'
The debt crisis has been attributed to many factors including the
oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80,' domestic policy errors of
the debtor countries,5 and the global recession and high interest rates
of 1980-82.6 Additional factors which have been cited include psy-
chological shifts in the credit markets, 7 mismanagement of resources
by borrowers,8 and imprudent lending by commercial banks and
2. In June 1982 the debt owed to industrial country banks was, in billion dollars: Mex-
ico 64.4, Brazil 55.3, Venezuela 27.2, Argentina 25.3, Chile 11.8, Colombia 5.5, and Peru 5.2.
W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT AND THE STABILITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 35 (1983).
Bank loans of 217.9 billion dollars in June 1983 to the Latin American countries repre-
sented almost three fifths of all bank loans outstanding to developing countries. T. ENDERS &
R. MATrrIONE, LATIN AMERICA: THE CRISIS OF DEBT AND GROWTH 1,9 (1984).
The total external debt of Latin America at the end of 1984 was 360.17 billion dollars. El
Tiempo, Bogot, Feb. 4, 1985, at 4C; ("EN 1984 10% creci6 servicio de la deuda de AmErica
Latina." Citing the CEPAL) [translation by author].
3. The debtor countries can no longer buy goods coming from the home-states of the
lenders in the same quantities they used to. See R. DALE & R. MATFIIONE, MANAGING
GLOBAL DEBT (1983) Note 10 at 4 [hereinafter cited as DAI.E].
4. CLINE, supra note 2, at 20-22.
5. Wiesner, Domestic and External Causes of the Latin American Debt Crisis, 22 FIN. &
DEv. 24, 25 (1985); CLINE supra note 2, at 26-29.
6. Wiesner, supra note 5, at 25; CILINE supra note 2, at 22-26.
7. CL INE supra note 2, at 29-30; Wiesner, supra note 5, at 25.
8. Corea, The Debt Problems of Developing Countries, 9 J. DEV. PLAN. 53 (1976).
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other credit institutions.9
These factors all contributed to the situation to some extent and
although this does not mean they are the only factors, for the pur-
poses of this analysis, they are the primary ones. These factors can
be classified in three groups: economic mismanagement by the bor-
rowers, imprudent lending by the creditors, and exogenous
circumstances.
Although some have argued that it does not matter where the
blame is laid,'0 this Article will demonstrate that certain exogenous
circumstances and imprudent lending by borrowers were the major
causes of the debt crisis."' From that conclusion the question of re-
sponsibility will then be examined.
The exogenous circumstances cited as causes of the debt crisis
are the two oil shocks (1973-74 and 1979-80) and the global recession
and high interest rates of 1980-82.
How did the oil shocks cause the debt crisis? Until 1979, the
non-oil developing countries, although very poor, managed to survive
in the world arena through their commodity-export earnings. When
oil prices rose, these countries used commerical loans to buy the
petroleum they needed to maintain their standard of living. Some
developing countries borrowed money to develop their own oil pro-
duction and, subsequently, borrowed more money on the promise of
oil exports. 2 This foreign borrowing created serious balance of pay-
ments and liquidity problems which are now part of the debt crisis.' 3
The second exogenous circumstance which contributed to the
debt crisis was the global recession and high interest rates of 1980-82.
The rise in real interest rates' 4 created a new burden on the develop-
ing countries with outstanding debt."' At the same time the world
recession meant less income from their exports and a decrease in the
9. Weinert, Coping with LDC Debt, 38 J. WORLD AFFAIRS 1 (1983).
10. Id.
11. But ef ENDERS, supra note 2, at 3. (The author does not agree with our point of
view).
12. CLINE, supra note 2, at 22.
13. Interview with Professor Yohannes Kassahun, Oklahoma University (Cambridge,
Mass., Apr. 29, 1985). The oil price rises themselves were due primarily to the OPEC cartel
formed by the major oil exporters. The question of the responsibility of OPEC members for the
consequences of their decisions in the non-OPEC countries remains open although there re-
mains some doubt regarding their liability to other developing countries for such acts. The
non-OPEC developing countries have not attacked the OPEC policies, perhaps fearing a loss of
sufficient supplies.
14. Interest Rate Minus Inflation Rate = Real Interest Rate.
15. For a technical explanation and analysis of the impact of the rise in interest rates see
ENDERS, supra note 2, at 15-18; CLINE, suprm note 2, at 22-26.
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overall quantity of exports. The higher interest rates, in the words of
Richard S. Cline were,
caused by the unusual mix of monetary and fiscal policy adopted
in the United States in 1980-82. . . . The basic cause of these ex-
cessive interest rates was the mismatch between loose fiscal policy
and tight monetary policy in the United States, which drove up
domestic (and international) interest rates in textbook fashion. 6
Some maintain that the deregulation of interest rates and the result-
ing competition among banks for depositors led to these high interest
rates.' 7 The worst effects of these economic policies were felt by the
developing countries where the floating interest rates on the out-
standing debt and the continuous appreciation of the dollar made
debt service an unbearable burden for many.
United States monetary policy is also considered to be one of the
causes of overlending and overborrowing in the 1970's. The expan-
sionary monetary policies carried on by the United States authorities
from 1973 through 1981 led to a drop in dollar real interest rates. It
became cheaper for the developing countries to borrow than to adopt
policies reducing expenditures. '
8
As previously pointed out, private commercial banks made sub-
stantial loans to many developing countries during the last decade.
The low risk premiums charged by the banks on these loans were a
mistake because they encouraged excessive borrowing and thus con-
tributed to the crisis. 19 This activity has been labeled as imprudent
lending by the banks. There is also evidence that the regulatory ini-
tiatives undertaken in the United States over the last ten years con-
tributed largely to encourage the banks' attitudes towards
international lending.
Confidence in United States banks attracted huge amounts of
money and placed these institutions in a good position to make loans.
This high degree of confidence can be attributed to deposit insurance
which covers deposits up to $100,000.20 This insurance, actually
covers 100 percent of the deposits as demonstrated by the Federal
16. CLINE, supra note 2, at 23, 24. The high interest rates also caused the severe recession
experienced by the world economy in 1980-82. The fees charged by the banks to the debtors
have been cited as another cause of the rapid growth of the debt burden, but fees are nothing
compared to the cost of the interest rates which are controlled by the economic policies of the
developed countries.
17. Thayer, Restoring Sanity to Interest Rates, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1984, at A31, col. I.
18. These rates were in fact negative in some circumstances. Folkerts-Landau, The Regu-
latory Origins of the International Debt Crisis, 167 BANKERS MAG. 44, 45 (1984).
19. Folkerts-Landau, supra note 18, at 47.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(a) (1980).
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Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) policy of supporting in-
sured banks.2" With this type of support, United States banks appear
to be very secure places to deposit money.
This de facto insurance together with the lender-of-last-resort
facilities (access to the United States Treasury in an emergency) were
important attractions which brought the oil-bonanza dollars to com-
mercial banks. This placed these institutions in a central position in
the international lending arena. In the 1970's, commercial banks as-
sumed the role that the multilateral institutions used to play in the
financing field. The debtor countries began to deal with business-
oriented creditors instead of the aid-oriented creditors they were used
to. If United States regulations of the banking system had not pro-
vided such incentives for private banks to assume this role in interna-
tional finance, there would not be such a huge debt crisis today.22
United States policies were not the only factors which developed
these attitudes toward lending. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
policies and the unlikely prospect of default on the part of sovereign
borrowers were also incentives to place loans at the disposal of the
lesser developed countries.
The IMF has been willing to support the weak economies of
lesser developed countries with medium and long-term loans, pro-
vided these countries accept certain conditions and monitoring by the
Fund.23 This gives private banks the security expressed by a banker
analyst: "[T]he greater the IMF's involvement in the business of
long term international lending, the lower will be the credit risk as-
sumed by the banks in making foreign loans."24
In sum, measures carried out by developed countries within
their sovereign territory were directed at domestic affairs,25 but these
activities affected economic conditions in many other countries. The
21. By using the so-called "purchase and assumption" method of protecting depositors,
the FDIC purchases all the bad assets of a failing bank and assumes possible losses. The result
is that depositors with more than $100,000 are protected as if they were fully insured. This
official support was recognized by the FDIC and the Comptroller of the Currency when they
affirmed that they would not permit the eleven largest United States banks to default. U.S.
Won't Let 11 Biggest Banks in Nation Fail, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1984, at 2, col. 2. For detailed
description and complete statistics on the FDIC rescues see C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 1983-84 (1983).
22. Folkerts-Landau, supra note 18, at 45. "After all, how much of a financial crisis
would there be today if OPEC nations were holding bond claims on other developing countries
rather than holding deposit claims on money center banks?"
23. Id. at 51.
24. Id.
25. See Bernstein, Do We Need a New Bretton Woods?, 21 FIN. & DEV. 5 (1984) (the
purpose was to slow inflation and costs).
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effects, in many Latin American countries have been disastrous. The
damage has been substantial and has contributed to a widening of the
gap between developed and developing countries.26
The United States, refusing to recognize the implications of their
domestic acts, have implemented policies such as the so-called "Rea-
ganomics, "27 which have kept real interest rates high.28  As long as
the lending policies of the developed countries do not adversely affect
their own domestic economies they will not believe they are the cause
of turbulence in the economies of other countries.29
The debtor's case, however, may not be hopeless. Recently,-the
United States stated that it is prepared to lead a monetary meeting.
30
In the announcement, the United States came close to recognizing
the international scope of its domestic economic policies. The sug-
gestions included the possibility of a revision of the operation of the
current system of floating exchange rates for currencies "through
better coordination of the countries' underlying economies."'' a  This
is as opposed to the French view that, "the discipline created by fixed
exchange rates would force countries to avoid such excesses in their
economies as high inflation and high interest rates. "32 In conclusion,
both positions recognize the need to control the domestic economic
policies of the different countries.
1. Colombia's Economic and External Debt Overview
Colombia's economic and debt situation will be described briefly
with the focus on the external debt and some additional internal eco-
nomic and political factors which were unavoidable. Colombia was
26. DALE, supra note 3, at 5.
27. For a complete analysis of the U.S. government's plans and acts related to the eco-
nomic policy see Reagan's High Risk Growth Game, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1985, at Fl, col. 2.
28. See Economic Growth Will Quicken, Leading to Higher Interest Rates Analysts Say,
Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1985, at 23, col. 2.
29. See Wiesner supra note 5, at 25. "The rapid rise in real interest rates and the world
recession precipitated the crisis and certainly aggravated it, but, important though they were
(and continue to be), they did not produce the crisis. Had external debt levels not been what
they were, these developments could not in themselves have brought on a crisis...."
Some important officials at the IMF also agree with the position that interest rates were
not the cause of the debt crisis. In fact, there have been suggestions among the developed
countries that a new institution be established within the IMF to examine the international
implications of the domestic policy of major nations and make recommendations. Farnsworth,
Currency Plan Stirs Skepticism, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1985, at Dl, col. 6.
30. See U.S. and its Allies Agree to Prepare for Trade Talks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1985, at
i, col. 6.
31. Baker Offers to Lead Currency Talks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1985, at 4, col. 4.
32. Id.
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chosen as an example for two reasons. First, it is the author's home.
Second, and most importantly, Colombia has avoided, thus far, rene-
gotiating or rescheduling its public external debt.
The total external debt (public and private; short, medium and
long term) of Colombia was $10.9 billion at the end of July 1984.
This is much smaller than that of the other major Latin American
borrowers.3" The size of the debt, however, does not give the com-
plete picture. Some other economic indicators give us an overview of
the reality:
The debt/GNP ratio rose from 19% in 1980 to about 32% in 1984.
The total debt service ratio which was 32% in 1981 (the public
debt service ratio being 15% and the private debt service account-
ing for the difference: 17%) also increased to about 40% in 1983
(with the public sector ratio reaching 24% and the private debt
service, 16%).
34
Turning now to the borrower structure, 66% of the total exter-
nal debt is owed by the public sector, 18% by the private corporate
sector and 16% by the country's financial system.35 The creditors, as
of July of 1984, broke down as follows: 36% of the total debt is owed
to official sources, (19% to multilateral agencies and 17% to bilateral
sources) and 5% to supplier credit agencies; about 60% is owed to
private financial institutions. Among the major creditors, two-thirds
are United States banks.36
The difficulties Colombia has been facing stem from internal and
external causes. The internal causes are primarily the lag in the rate
of exchange and the public sector deficit.3 7 This indicates that inter-
nal circumstances are partially responsible for the crisis. The Colom-
bian government has taken measures to correct the internal factors.
The measures include fiscal reform, the introduction of new taxes
and reduced government expenditures a.3  At the same time, the de-
33. Colombia's Economic Program and External Debt Management Strategy, presented
by the Colombian Minister of Finance to the Creditor Banks in New York, Dec. 1984, (unpub-
lished document) [hereinafter cited as CEPEDMS] (copy on file with California Western Inter-
national Law Journal).
34. Id. at 29, 30 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 30.
36. Id. at 32.
37. Pizano Salazar, La Economia Colombiana en las Ultimas Dos Dicadas, El Tiempo,
Bogota, Feb. 1I, 1985, at I, 6c. The lag in the rate of exchange has produced an over-valuation
of the currency which is reflected in the decrease of export competitiveness. The public sector
deficit generates pressure on the financial market as well as increases the rate of inflation,
among other things. [Translation by author].
38. In 1982 a tax reform was adopted. In 1983 the income tax system was reformed; and
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valuation rate has been accelerated. These measures have placed a
heavy burden on the backs of the Colombian people.
The external causes are mostly the same as those which affect
other Latin American countries, that is, the drop in commodity
prices, the oil shocks, the high interest rates, and the world recession.
The Latin American debt crisis itself and the international credit
squeeze are additional factors which have affected Colombia. Each
one of these will be considered separately after an overview of the
economic setting is presented.
1. Economic Setting. Recall the consequences of high interest
rates in the Latin American countries.39 Colombia has suffered in
the same way, especially the private sector debtors who had stipu-
lated their debt in commercial terms. Table 1 illustrates how the
payments of interest and fees on the public debt have grown dispro-
portionately when compared to the growth of outstanding debt dur-
ing the same period. In particular the sum of all payments including
interest, fees and amortization has been growing tremendously since
1979.
Nominal interest rates have risen to the point that credit today
is more expensive than ten years ago. Table 2 illustrates that the
average amortization period has decreased from twenty-two years in
1970 to fourteen in 1984. As President Betancur noted recently:
"Colombia has spent more than $3.5 billion on interest and repay-
ments abroad, while receiving only about $2.5 billion in terms of re-
sources disbursed by multilateral agencies and the international
private banks."'
Table 3 shows the amount of the private debt outstanding and
its service in the last fourteen years. The higher burden began in
1979 and it is reflected in the huge increases in the debt service. The
amount of the debt has been increasing substantially and this illus-
trates the fact that many private corporations have been increasing
their debt just to service their previously acquired obligations. In
other words, there has been no real capital input, only accounting
movements.
The debt service inequity has been inflamed by the commodity
the sales tax was modified in 1984. Gasoline prices were increased in 1984, and an increase of
25% in import tariffs was adopted. See CEPEDMS, supra note 33, at 3.
39. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
40. Address by President Betancur, Colombia's Program of Macroeconomic Adjustment
With Self-Discipline and Development, Washington, Apr. 3, 1985. (Copy on file with California
Western International Law Journal). See also Pizano Salazar, supra note 37, at 1, 6c.
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slump. Colombia has the fifth largest economy of Latin America.4'
During the last twenty-five years Colombia "has been transformed
from a predominantly agricultural and rural society into an increas-
ingly urban and industrial society."42 The urban population has in-
creased from 39% in 1951 to 66% in 1981."3 However, Colombia's
foreign earnings depend mostly on coffee, which accounts for more
than 50% of the export revenues. Coffee prices, though artificially
sustained since 1960 by the International Coffee Agreement, have not
been high enough to offset the country's expenditures in foreign ex-
change. The steep drop in coffee and other export commodity prices
following the 1981-82 world recession affected the country's econ-
omy adversely. This is only partially offset by the fact that Colombia
has been importing petroleum at a low rate, 27,000 barrels a day,"
and is expected to become a net exporter of petroleum by 1986." 5
2. The Latin American Debt Crisis and the International Credit
Squeeze. The economic difficulties experienced by Colombia's neigh-
bors and trading partners was another major factor in Colombia's
current problems. The Colombian government's comments about
this matter speak for themselves:
Exports to Venezuela (one of Colombia's major non-traditional
trading partners), Ecuador, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica
and Chile, have fallen significantly since 1982 following economic
problems, major devaluations and import restrictions in those
countries. In particular the speculation against the Colombian
peso after the 1983 and 1984 Venezuelan devaluations exacerbated
Colombia's problems. It is worth mentioning the impact of the
Venezuela [sic] problems on the trade and service exchange with
Colombia. It has been estimated that Colombia lost about US$450
million p.a. in foreign income as a result of the Venezuelan deci-
sions to devalue its currency and restrict payments.
46
This demonstrates clearly that domestic economic measures
taken in one country can have direct consequences in the economy of
another. In the Venezuelan case, the devaluation of the Bolivar and
other related measures had adverse consequences on Colombia. This
41. After Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela.
42. Address by President Betancur, supra note 40.
43. Colombia Today, Commemorative Issue, Visit of President Belisario Betancur of Co-
lombia to the United States, Apr. 1985, at 4. (Copy on file with California Western Interna-
tional Law Journal).
44. Id. at 7.
45. Business Latin America, Oct. 17, 1984, at 332.
46. CEPEDMS, supra note 33, at 9.
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economic injury was substantial and the relationship between Vene-
zuela's domestic acts and the Colombian economy is undeniable.47
The Latin American debt crisis has resulted in an international
credit squeeze. As a result, despite Colombia's good standing before
multilateral agencies and its excellent record of paying outstanding
debts, it is suffering from a lack of liquidity. International banks
have decided to cut resource flows and tighten the loan terms to Co-
lombia, even the commercial loans traditionally offered through fi-
nancial institutions are unavailable.48 This has resulted in a dramatic
loss of Colombian reserves from almost $5 billion in 1982 to $1.5
billion in 1984. The tightening credit restrictions are difficult to ex-
plain since even the World Bank told the community of private bank-
ers that, in its opinion, Colombia deserved new credits.49
The problems of other Latin American debtors and the interna-
tional credit squeeze have both resulted in a decrease in Colombia's
economic growth. The GNP growth fell from an average of 5.4%
during the second half of the 1970's to 4.1% in 1980 and to 0.9% in
1983.50 This reflects a lower quality of life, increased social problems
and, to a certain extent, political unrest. Although Colombia is one
of the few South American countries which has sustained a demo-
cratic government since the early 19th century, the unemployment
and social unrest resulting from these economic measures have
brought life to various armed groups which may threaten to topple
the government.5 1
II. THE RIGHT-DUTY APPROACH TO STATE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR EXTERNAL CONSEQUENCES OF DOMESTIC ACTS
This section will discuss the rights and obligations of States for
the damaging external consequences of their acts. The following is-
sues are relevant to this discussion: (a) the existence or nonexistence
of a duty to take into account the external effects of domestic acts; (b)
47. Villamil, The Outlook for Colombia's Creditworthiness, 167 BANKERS MAG. 24, 25
(1984).
48. AMERICAN EMBASSY BOGOTA, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for
the United States, Colombia Nov. 1984.
49. Colombia se Merece Nuepos Criditos: Banco Mundial, El Espectador, Bogoti, Jan. 30,
1985, at 1, 7a [translation by author].
50. CEPEDMS, supra note 33, at 12, 13.
51. The author believes that democratic paths should be followed in order to reach any
type of political, economic or social goal. It is true, nevertheless that the goals pursued by
some armed movements in the world can be the social and economic justice. This implies that
whenever changes are needed, there can be two opposite ways of reaching that same goal. The
author supports the pacific path.
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the scope of rights in the affected countries; (c) the legal effects and
consequences of a breach of this duty in the international arena; and
(d) the responsibility or liability of the acting countries for the inju-
ries suffered and the right to compensation or another form of
cooperation.
A. Relevant Sources of International Law
First, two traditional sources of international law, treaties and
custom, will be discussed. Then a more non-traditional source,
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, will be examined.
1. Treaties. Provisions of two treaties, the Charter of the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS) and the IMF Agreement, will
be considered. Both serve as valid sources of international law. Each
of these treaties will be analyzed separately.
(a) The OAS Charter. Since the debt problem is centered pri-
marily in the Latin American countries, all of whom are members of
the OAS, it is helpful to analyze the provisions of that organization's
charter which are relevant to this discussion.
Article 9 of the OAS Charter reads as follows:
The political existence of the State is independent of recognition
by other States. Even before being recognized, the State has the
right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its
preservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as
it sees fit, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its
services, and to determine the jurisdiction and competence of its
courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by the exercise of
the rights of other States in accordance with international law. (Em-
phasis added).
The wording of this provision suggests a limitation, imposed by
international law, on the sovereign rights of States even within their
jurisdiction. If there is such a limitation the State which is being
limited has a duty to abstain from doing things it would otherwise be
entitled to do.5
Article 15 of the OAS Charter indicates that States do not have
the right to intervene in the affairs of other States including the polit-
ical, economic and cultural elements of the State. Article 15 reads:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
52. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter supports the recognition as international law of the
rule of non-intervention. Although it refers to the U.N. it can be extended to any third party,
any juridical person under international law, including States.
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indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external af-
fairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only
armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted
threat against the personality of the state or against its political,
economic and cultural elements.
Analyzing these two provisions jointly, a State has the right to
regulate its domestic economic-related activities. However, like
many rights, this one can be limited by international law, as outlined
by Article 9. At the same time, a State does not have a right to
interfere in the economic affairs of other States, as stated in Article
15. This provision does not mention the way in which interference
can occur, so it is possible to conclude that one form of interference
under this rule could be domestic economic acts which have damag-
ing consequences on other States. A State therefore would have a
duty to abstain from economic acts that interfere with the economic
and political activities of other States. States have the right to pursue
their domestic policies limited only to the extent that they do not
conflict with the rights of other States. A State can pursue whatever
economic policy it desires within its jurisdiction as long as this policy
does not violate other States' rights.53
(b) The IMF Agreement. IMF has been an important part of
international finance since the 1960's. 4 The IMF agreement is an
international commitment by the member countries to comply with
or carry out certain economic policies which are ultimately policed
53. Although the OAS Charter is international law only to the States which ratified it, the
UN Charter stipulates the non-interference in domestic affairs. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7)
and 55.
54. A. CHAYE, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS,
MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE 719 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CHAYES]. The
IMF's role in the numerous crises, in which it has intervened, has been criticized. However,
the fundamental role this institution has played in contemporary economics must be recog-
nized. The Fund will continue to be important as long as the methods of financial assistance
are managed by the surplus countries, who finance the IMF with their contributions.
In general, the Fund was a product of the post-war planning of United States and United
Kingdom economists and politicians. The United States wanted to achieve "the reconstruction
of a multilateral system of world trade." Id. The establishment of an international financial
institution would therefore mean an alternative to exchange restrictions, competitive currency
depreciations and other methods countries have used to keep their economies afloat. The
United Kingdom's goal reflected a different position. "Our long-term policy must ensure that
countries which conduct their affairs prudently need not be afraid that they would be prevented
from meeting their international liabilitites by causes outside their control." Id. at 723. The
British took this position foreseeing the day that they would be a debtor. If a country was in
deficit, the British felt they should have automatic access to the Fund's resources. The United
States thought the access should meet certain conditions. The last position prevailed. A coun-
try must meet certain conditions established by the Fund to be able to use its resources. Id.
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by the Fund through the surveillance power conferred by Article IV
§ 3. This commitment constitutes an explicit recognition of the in-
ternational scope of domestic economic-related activities and thus
corroborates the existence of the duty. The members of the IMF
have waived, to a certain extent, their sovereignty in financial mat-
ters. The IMF has assumed, with the consent of its members, some
of the powers which belonged to them individually. The surveillance
provision implies the existence of a duty to take into account the
external effects of certain domestic acts such as the establishment of
exchange rates. The most explicit obligations regarding domestic
policies are established in Article IV § 1 which reads:
In particular, each member shall: (i) endeavor to direct its eco-
nomic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering or-
derly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due
regard to its circumstances; (ii) seek to promote stability by foster-
ing orderly underlying economic and financial conditions and a
monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international mone-
tary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments ad-
justment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other
members; and (iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the
undertakings under this Section.
These commitments are quite broad and can include a wide
range of economic measures. The countries which are controlling
the IMF today are breaching the commitment set forth in subsection
(1), since the Fund's policy toward the debtor countries has created
negative growth through deflation. Furthermore, the maintenance of
a policy of budget deficits, like the United States has done, could
"tend to produce erratic disruptions" in the economic and financial
conditions of the world. If a country has committed itself to promote
stability and to avoid these kinds of situations, it is breaching the
agreement where its domestic acts have injurious consequences in
other countries which have acted in a prudent manner.
(c) Conclusion. States have recognized the existence of a duty
that limits their activities and their sovereignty. At the same time,
they have guarded against any measure that would imply a prohibi-
tion against certain activity they might wish to carry out later. The
treaties examined are evidence that States recognize the existence of
the duty but there is no mechanism to ensure the fulfillment of that
obligation. In other words, there has been no enforcement provision
established regarding this obligation.
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2. Custom. It is difficult to determine whether or not there is a
custom of international law on this point, but in order to find out it is
necessary to examine the activities of the parties. The difficulty stems
from the differences in opinions and practices between the First and
Third World States. In fact, while the developed countries have de-
nied the existence of the duty and any responsibility for the conse-
quences of their domestic economic-related activities, the lesser
developed countries have stated that the debt burden should be
shared by both the creditor and the debtor governments. First the
position of the developed countries will be examined and then the
Latin American governments' position will be considered.
(a) The Position of the Creditor Governments. The position of
the creditor governments is best illustrated by the actions they take
with regard to the debt crisis. As previously indicated, the enormous
'government budget deficits of the United States have placed upward
pressure on interest rates due to the extensive borrowing undertaken
to finance those deficits. The United States Treasury asserts that the
deficit's relation to the turbulence in the world economies cannot be
proven by economic statistics, 55 and they have come close to saying
that the United States has no responsibility for the problem at all.56
In the London Summit Communiqu6 of June 9, 1984," 7 the de-
veloped countries refused to recognize the real impact of their eco-
nomic policies on the rest of the world. The Communiqu6 failed to
recognize the link between the fiscal deficit and interest rates in the
United States as well as the chance that high interest rates will close
off economic recovery in America and the summit countries in
general. 58
A close analysis of the Summit Communiqu6 does provide some
evidence of the recognition of "[t]he economic interdependence of the
industrialized and the developed countries."5 9 The CommuniquE
also stated that the goal of improving the operation and stability of
the international financial system should be met by means of prudent
policies on the part of the major countries. The seven nations agreed
"[t]o strengthen policies to reduce inflation and interest rates, to
55. Meissner, Debt: Reform Without Governments, 56 FOREIGN POL'Y 81, 86 (1984).
56. Rogers, The United States and Latin America, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 577 (1984).
57. London Communiqud on the Resolution of Debt Problem, 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 1179-81 (1984).
58. Meissner, supra note 55, at 84. The Parties to the Communique are: Canada, Euro-
pean Communities, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and
the United States.
59. London Communique, supra note 57, at 1179 (1984).
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control monetary growth and where necessary reduce budgetary
deficits."'
The developed countries expressed concern for the fate of the
debtor countries, but have not provided any decisive aid. The United
States believes that "[w]hat is good economic policy for America is
good for the rest of the world."' 6 1 In turn the developed countries
have left the management of the debt crisis to the private banks and
the IMF, which they control. 62 The developed countries have
stressed that the appropriate forums for resolving international eco-
nomic problems are the IBRD (World Bank), the IMF and the
OECD. Furthermore, the Congress of the United States has de-
clared, in section 1102 of Public Law 98-181 of 1983, that "the eco-
nomic policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund can be
harmful to economic growth" and that "the International Monetary
Fund should revise the conditions placed on its loans so as to en-
courage economic growth." The lesser developed countries long
complained that the policies of the IMF lead to a negative growth of
the economy. But, the express recognition of this fact by the United
States authorities is much more meaningful since the Fund is con-
trolled by the developed countries. This means that there is a con-
sensus towards the negative effect of the IMF's "suggestions"
whenever a country asks for financial help. This implies an accept-
ance of the fact that the IMF's policies and the existing framework
are not working and need to be changed. This consensus is not re-
flected in the developed countries' actions.
The IMF has prescribed political measures in order to assure the
participation of the private banks in supplying more funds to the ail-
ing economies of the debtors. This indirect intervention is described
by William D. Rogers as follows:
Though the 1984 restructuring-cum-adjustment agreements were
made in form between the private banks and the Latin debtors,
they involved in practice large public policy decisions-how tight to
turn the economic screws, how much to expand the flow of fresh
financing. The United States was engaged in those decisions [. .]
in the inner councils of the IMF and determining how far to press
the banks for new capital, lowered commissions and flexibility on
stretching out repayment.63
60. Id. at 1180.
61. See Pine, The Outlook of Selling Reaganomics to the World-Again, Wall St. J., Mar.
11, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
62. See London Communiqui, supra note 57, at 1179-81.
63. Rogers, supra note 56, at 578.
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This demonstrates that the developed countries have indirectly
participated in establishing the policy guidelines that the IMF fol-
lows. It is no secret that these conditions involve painful measures
and, although directed to the economy, they are political in charac-
ter.' 4 Thus, we can deduce that the developed countries are setting
up the political guidelines of the debtor countries. If they are doing
so, the acceptance of the international scope of certain domestic
measures is implied since, otherwise, the developed countries would
not have any interest in the debtor countries' economies.
The fact is that the debt crisis is also a problem of the developed
countries. The developed countries have to worry about the deterio-
rating economies of the Latin American countries which represent a
very important market for their products.65 For example, if the
Latin American countries stop or greatly reduce the consumption of
United States and/or European goods, the United States and/or Eu-
ropean producers and their economies would suffer. This is not the
only problem the creditor countries have. They also have to worry
about the stability of their banking system. In fact, some of the larg-
est United States banking institutions have overexposed themselves
to Latin American countries.66
If the problem is a common one, all the parties involved should
assume some responsibility and follow policies directed toward a so-
lution. The Latin American countries have been carrying out painful
policies looking forward to a recuperation, but what have the devel-
oped countries done?
The developed countries have made declarations, but have failed
to act accordingly, leading to the conclusion that the summit coun-
tries believe that the debt problems must be solved by the developing
countries. The lesser developed countries receive aid only through
the institutional methods such as the IMF and the World Bank.
Only if the developing countries apply the IMF's plans, which in the
terms of the Summit Communiqu6, bring "social and political diffi-
culties,"'67 will they receive help in the sense of encouragement for
64. See Roberts, World Debt: The IMFSolution Has Become the Problem, Bus. WK., Jul.
9, 1984, at 12. "'The involvement of the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, The Federal Reserve Board,
and other government institutions in the contractual relationship between debtors and creditors
has politicized the loans .. ."
65. Poniachek, U.S. International Banking and the Latin American Market, 166 BANKERS
MAG. 12 (1983). "Latin America is a major market for the U.S., accounting for 15-18% of
U.S. international banking activities."
66. Id. at 14. "The 24 largest U.S. banks accounted for $66 billion, or 70% of total U.S.
claims on Latin America by June 1982."
67. London Communiqueo, supra note 57, at 1180 (1984). The U.S. has limited itself to
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rescheduling by the commercial banks.
While, on the surface, the industrialized countries do not want
to see the problem from a political point of view, they are manipulat-
ing the IMF to obtain policy changes in the lesser developed coun-
tries. It has become clear that if the debtor countries follow IMF
policies, the developed countries will encourage "more extended mul-
tiyear rescheduling of commercial debts. .... "68 This evidences a
negation of the political responsibility issue, as well as, any type of
obligation on their part. The developed countries do not want to see
the problem from a political point of view because they would have
to assume, to some extent, their responsibility in the debt problem.
In summary, if the creditor States are responsible to any extent,
they are not willing to admit it. Their attitude, as reflected in IMF
policies, is concern for the international scope of their domestic ac-
tions, but there is no evidence of a belief in the existence of a duty.
First, since the developed countries are constantly taking do-
mestic measures without considering the possible external effects,
there is no sustained practice of accepting the duty to take into ac-
count the external effects of domestic acts. Second, the opinio juris
may be present at some point, but the developed countries have been
very careful in preserving their almost absolute sovereign rights. If
the opinio juris implies a recognition of the limitation of the sover-
eignty, it is not present either.
To the contrary, if there is a custom in the process of formation
which establishes the duty to take into account the effects of domestic
economic-related acts, the developed countries have been persistent
objectors to it.
69
(b) The Debtor Government's Position. Eleven Latin American
countries70 have expressed their opinions concerning the debt crisis
jointly through the "Consensus of Cartagena" Declaration, issued
approving an increase in its quota to the IMF demonstrating that the developed countries have
acted as if they were bankers. They are protecting commercial interests of a few private per-
sons and ignoring the social and political unrest their policies cause in the developing world.
To protect the interests of their financial monsters and their shareholders, they are trying to
impose harsh economic policies on the developing countries. As previously stated, these poli-
cies generate slower, if not negative, growth of the economies of the poor countries, thus widen-
ing and perpetuating the gap between the First and Third World.
68. Id. at 1180.
69. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (3d ed. 1979).
70. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mex-
ico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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June 22, 1984. 7' The Declaration stresses the fact that the debt
crisis was largely a product of factors, which were beyond the control
of Latin American countries.72 The factors mentioned are the inter-
national recession and stagnation of the economies of the industrial-
ized countries, restrictive trade policies and the increases in interest
rates. Acknowledging the fact that the crisis cannot be solved
through individual talks with the creditors, the Latin American gov-
ernments strive for general policy guidelines on the restructuring and
refinancing of debts. The declaration points out that:
[T]his frame of reference ha[s] to take into account the co-respon-
sibility of the parties involved in the search for a permanent solu-
tion to the problem. These parties are the governments of both the
lender and debtor Nations, international financial institutions and
the international banks. . . .[T]his frame of reference ha[s] to in-
corporate the concept of an equitable distribution of the cost of eco-
nomic adjustment. This adjustment process ha[s] to be
symmetrical and fair in order to be effective. Sustained world eco-
nomic growth demand[s] changes in the economic policies pur-
sued by some industrialized countries. The Ministers pointed out
the need for these countries to move rapidly to adopt policies to
provide a spur for economic growth at the same time facilitating a
reduction in interest rates without prejudice to the goal of control-
ling inflation .... [T]hey (the Ministers) also referred to the imme-
diate need to create conditions that would permit the resumption
of the flow of funds between these two groups of countries and
provide permanent and significant alleviation of the debt service
burden. Without these measures, Latin American efforts at eco-
nomic readjustment will be fruitless.
7 3
After examining the situation of the debtor governments and
finding, among other things, that direct foreign investment could not
play a decisive role in solving the external debt problems of Latin
America,74 the Ministers went on to make seventeen proposals urg-
ing the governments of the industrialized countries to act in an effec-
tive way.
71. Cartagena Communiqui on Foreign Debt and Economic Development 23 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1169-78 (1984).
72. Id. at 1170.
73. Id. at 1172 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 1173. The CommuniquE reads as follows:
The ministers went on to say foreign direct investment could play a supplementary
role by contributing capital and technological transfer, creating employment and gen-
erating exports provided that it conforms to the policies and laws each country has
established in this field. However, the contribution foreign investment could make in
terms of providing foreign exchange in helping to solve the external deficit was lim-
ited, therefore, it could not play a decisive role in solving external debt problems.
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Among the proposals, were two which are relevant to this issue.
The first proposal calls for the adoption of measures to reduce the
interest rates in international markets." The other asks for a review
of the IMF conditionality criteria.16  These suggestions, together
with the considerations above, give us an idea of the thoughts and
feelings of the Latin American countries.
It can easily be deduced from the evidence that the Latin Ameri-
can governments give great importance to the domestic policies of
the industrialized countries. They call for a change in those policies
in order to be able to cope with the problem. They affirmed that they
were willing to pay, but the burden should not be borne by them
alone. They are partisans of "an equitable distribution of the cost of
the economic adjustment." This means that the developed countries
should assume a degree of responsibility in solving the problem.
They are asking for a "fair adjustment process" which must include
effective measures on the part of the developed countries.
The Latin American governments also believe that the problem
is a political one, and as such, it must be dealt with in political terms
through a common dialogue." The governments, however, have ac-
ted in the opposite manner when renegotiating their debts individu-
ally and recently failed to reach an agreement to start the dialogue.7"
The Latin American governments believe that the world econ-
omy and specifically their weak economies are directly affected by the
domestic economic-related measures taken by developed countries.
The Latin American governments not only believe this, but they have
75. The proposal reads as follows: "'The adoption of measures leading to the immediate
and drastic reduction of nominal and real interest rates in international markets had to consti-
tute a fundamental objective towards which the governments of industrialized nations ought to
direct their best efforts." Id.
76. The proposal reads as follows:
IMF conditionality criteria should be reviewed to: I. Give priority to expanding
production and increasing employment keeping in mind the specific economic, social
and political situation of each country. II. Exclude the impact of increases in inter-
national interest rates above the level assumed in stabilization programs when setting
fiscal and balance of payment goals to avoid the excessive reduction of public invest-
ment and imports. III. Allow for modifications in monetary goals so that they might
absorb unforeseen increases in inflation rates and avoid bottlenecks that run counter
to the agreed stabilizations targets.
Id. at 1175.
77. Roberts, supra note 64, at 12. In the concept of the Latin American countries, the
developed countries must start recognizing their responsibility in the problem and take the
neccessary measures to alleviate the harm that their policies have in part caused.
78. See Dominican Republic CommuniquE, Feb. 9, 1985, Piden Solucidn Definitiva a la
Deuda Latinoamericana, El Espectador, Bogotai, Feb. 10, 1985, at 17. It can be concluded that
they were compelled to negotiate individually to avoid the paralysis of their economies, and
they could reconcile their acts with their words. [Translation by author].
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also asserted this position. The consequence of this position is the
political point of view, from which they have proposed to approach
the problem. The political responsibility lies on both the debtor and
creditor nations, as well as, on the multilateral institutions.79 If there
is co-responsibility froin the political point of view, there is a duty on
the part of the creditor States. This duty, for the time being, consists
of not only extending enough aid but also abstaining from causing
more economic fluctuations outside their borders. The Latin Ameri-
can countries firmly believe in this duty and in the co-responsibility
because they blame, among other things, the economic policies of the
industrialized countries.
The need for foreign exchange is such that the Latin American
countries have been forced to act individually and no opiniojuris has
developed. They must abide by the conditions established by the de-
veloped countries and the multilateral institutions. Developed coun-
tries will not provide foreign currency unless the debtor governments
play their game. If they do not, their countries would be paralyzed
and the social costs would be great.8" Colombia's case has been cho-
sen to illustrate this fact. A country without foreign exchange can-
not survive given the economically interdependent nature of the
world today. So, the apparent contradiction between words and
deeds is forced and cannot be taken as voluntary. The fact is that
there is this contradiction and, as such, it is a strong argument
against the existence of the duty. Therefore, one cannot say that
there is a practice and an opinio juris since the Latin American gov-
ernments maintain that the debt problem is common. The Latin
American governments also maintain that developed countries have
the duty to take into account the external effects of their domestic
economic policies but, at the same time, the former have bowed their
heads and accepted stringent programs imposed by the developed
countries through the IMF, without requiring more decisive action
on the part of the developed countries that would alleviate the bur-
den. There is no consistent practice nor opinion that can lead to the
assertion that the Latin American countries recognize as law the
79. The political responsibility is the joint determination and establishment of policies that
can fulfill the obligations of economic cooperation and economic independence.
80. See Weatherstone, International Debt Problems and the Banks: Some Questions and
Answers, Sovereign Debt: Recent Regulatory and Lending Issues and Practices 33, 34 (1983).
There have been occasional proposals for organizing debtor countries for the purpose
of increasing their leverage on lenders, but so far none of them has gone anywhere.
Such efforts have failed because, in addition to reluctance to jeopardize future access
to credit, the situations of individual countries are sufficiently diverse to make finding
common ground extremely difficult.
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duty to take into account the external effects of the domestic eco-
nomic-related acts. It could be argued, however, that the Latin
American governments have acted against their declarations of keep-
ing the problem on a common basis because they have been in need
of financial resources to avoid a paralysis of their economies. This
argument is valid, if we can prove that there has been economic coer-
cion. Although, could one say that there is a custom when there is
only opinio juris not practice, arguing that the practice would have
been present if there would not have been coercion to prevent it?
(c) Conclusion. There are two opposite practices which concur-
rently deny and accept the existence of a custom recognized as inter-
national law. Thus, there is a rule that is accepted by some States of
the world, while others do not accept it. Alternatively, it is possible
that two different rules of international law, in the process of forma-
tion, are before us. One recognizes the responsibility for the conse-
quences of the domestic economic-related acts and the other
reaffirms the old rule of pacta sunt servanda.
3. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. The position
of the resolutions and declarations adopted by the UN General As-
sembly is certainly one of the most controversial issues in contempo-
rary international law. The traditionalists value them as mere
evidence of a State practice, while some of the lesser developed coun-
tries believe they are equally as important as any of the traditional
sources of international law. 8' Whatever their status UN Resolu-
tions are important under international law and must always be
taken into account when considering an issue of contemporary im-
portance.82 Provisions of the New International Economic Order
Declaration (NIEO),8 3 the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States (CERDS)84 and the Declaration of Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Between
States8" are of particular relevance to this discussion.
(a) Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations. This Decla-
81. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 103 (1980); BROWNLIE, supra note 69, at 14.
82. U.N. General Assembly resolutions are important because they express the needs and
wishes of the international community, because they reflect the opinion of changing standards
of international law, and also because they are adopted by the majority of the States of the
world community.
83. G.A. Res. 3201, Sixth Special Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I), at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974).
84. G.A. Res. 3281, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
85. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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ration was adopted by consensus and the member States acknowl-
edged that the principles adopted in it are the agreed interpretation
of the UN Charter. This means that there should be no dispute as to
the value of the Declaration under international law. It is agreed
that it expresses principles of international law.
The relevant principle expressed in the Declaration is the one
which proclaims that a State has a duty to cooperate with other
States to promote, among other things, international economic stabil-
ity. The Declaration asserts that "States should cooperate in the pro-
motion of economic growth throughout the world, especially that of
the developing countries." 86 This implies a duty to carry on actions
directed toward fulfilling the goal of economic growth. In order to
reach this goal the States should implement policies in accordance
with the Declaration. If a policy is not achieving the goal of eco-
nomic growth but instead is promoting negative growth, that State is
not complying with its duty to promote international economic sta-
bility. When a State has not taken into account the external effects
of its domestic policies it is not complying with this duty. Therefore,
the duty to take into account the external consequences of domestic
economic-related acts can be derived from the principles adopted in
the Declaration.
(b) The New International Economic Order Declaration. This
Declaration was adopted by consensus of the UN General Assembly.
It is the basic expression of the lesser developed countries against the
established order. In the Declaration, the interdependence of the
States is mentioned several times. Emphasis is made in the preamble
that the NIEO is based on "common interest and cooperation among
all States." 87 Further on, the declaration explicitly affirms that inter-
national cooperation for development is the "shared goal and com-
mon duty of all countries."88 These affirmations imply that all States
have a duty to cooperate to achieve development. If a country is
acting in a way inconsistent with the goal of development, it would
be breaching a duty and, therefore, would be liable under interna-
tional law. One way of acting inconsistently with the duty to pro-
mote cooperation in development would be to carry on domestic
economic policies that generate negative growth in other countries.
Negative growth is inimical to the achievement of development
which can only be reached through real positive growth. In this re-
86. Id.
87. Supra note 83.
88. Id.
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spect, it can be said that the NIEO Declaration indirectly establishes
the duty to take into account the external effects of domestic acts.
The Program of Action on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order8 9 reasserts this interpretation of the NIEO.
In fact, the Program of Action specifically stipulates that all efforts
should be made to reform the international monetary system with
measures "to check the inflation already experienced by the devel-
oped countries, to prevent it from being transferred to developing
countries and to study and devise possible arrangements within the
International Monetary Fund to mitigate the effects of inflation in
developed countries on the economies of developing countries."'
This wording makes it clear that the drafters were referring to
domestic policies, which had the possibility of having external effects.
If the example of the interest rates is used, the same idea could be
applied. The drafters were trying to assert the duty to take into ac-
count the effects of domestic policies when they insisted on measures
to check inflation in the countries that were suffering. This was done
to prevent the problem from being transferred to other countries.
(c) The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Since
its adoption, the CERDS, as one of the pivots of the NIEO, has not
achieved wide acceptance by industrialized States. Although it was
intended to be a sign of the codification and progressive development
of the international law of development, it is not representative of the
status of the law, since the developed countries do not accept it as
such. Nevertheless, it contains a provision that reaffirms the exist-
ence of a rule of international law recognized by the majority of the
countries of the world community representing many different
groups. Article 24 stipulates: "All States have the duty to conduct
their mutual economic relations in a manner which takes into ac-
count the interests of the other countries. In particular, all States
should avoid prejudicing the interests of developing countries." 9'
If the last sentence of the article, which could be controversial,
is disregarded, the statement of a recognized principle can be found.
In the monetary field, it is recognized in the IMF agreement. 92 It
was recognized in the Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Between the States.
89. G.A. Res. 3202, Sixth Special Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I), at 25, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974).
90. Id.
91. CERDS, supra note 84.
92. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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This is the clearest recital of the duty. It is obvious that the State's
sovereignty has a limit. No State may act in a way that has a poten-
tial to harm other States. If a State takes certain domestic actions,
that in turn have injurious consequences in other States, the acting
State would be breaching its duty to consider the effects of its acts. It
would be exercising powers beyond its sovereignty. It would be
breaching the rule stipulated in Article 24 of the CERDS and, there-
fore, would be responsible to the injured States under international
law. Furthermore, every State recognizes the right to self-determina-
tion. Thus, it could be argued that this right is violated whenever a
State suffers injurious consequences due to domestic acts of other
States, since the acting State is exercising indirect influence in the
injured State's affairs.
A clear example of a breach of this duty can be seen in the rela-
tions between Colombia and the United States. As demonstrated al-
ready, United States domestic economic policies forced interest rates
up, thereby injuring Colombia's interests. In addition, the current
policies of the United States contributed to the international credit
squeeze which only makes the debt crisis worse. The United States
exercised powers beyond its sovereignty. It specifically did not avoid
prejudicing a developing country, which is contrary to Article 24 of
the OAS Charter.
(d) Conclusion. These declarations express a belief in the inter-
dependence of nations and the need to avoid the damaging conse-
quences which can arise from the domestic affairs of one country.9"
The NIEO and the CERDS serve to develop the concepts ex-
pressed in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations. The Declaration expresses a duty to
cooperate to achieve economic growth especially in the developing
countries. The NIEO reaffirms the goal of cooperation for develop-
ment while the CERDS spells out a duty to use due regard in the
interests of the other States.
The declarations represent the single duty to think of other
States when acting even when the acts are domestic in character.
States cannot forget that domestic acts may have a broader influence
than just within the national boundaries. This duty is expressed in
93. The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Between States is an undisputed expression of international law. The other
declarations are not neutral, however, as Professor Schacter describes them "[tlhey are, by and
large, challenges to the existing order and their leading motif is the demand for a wider distri-
bution of wealth." Schacter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (1976).
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the new developments of the law found through the UN General As-
sembly. When considered together the declarations are consistent
with both traditional Western international law and the lesser devel-
oped countries law of development.
B. Affected Countries' Right
If a correlative right exists the affected countries would be enti-
tled to demand measures be taken against the acting country to pre-
vent the injuries which the acts could cause. They would also be
entitled to compensation whenever there is damage.
The existence of this right can be inferred from the counter-obli-
gations created by the UN General Assembly Resolutions cited
above. The existence of this right, however, has not been recognized.
The affected States have some rights that are recognized under inter-
national law. These rights are the right to noninterference, the right
to nonintervention and the right to pursue freely any type of eco-
nomic or social system. These rights are limited to requiring "coop-
eration" on the part of the acting States.94
C. Final Considerations on the Right-Duty Approach
International treaties, particularly the IMF Agreement which is
concerned directly with economic matters, recognize the interna-
tional scope of certain domestic activities carried on by the States.
Consequently, a mechanism of surveillance has been created. The
United States has enacted legislation to implement strict surveillance
over the lending activities of its banks. The declaration of policy of
12 U.S.C. § 3901 states: "It is the policy of the Congress to assure
that the economic health and stability of the United States and the
other nations of the world shall not be adversely affected or
threatened in the future by imprudent lending practices or inade-
quate supervision."
Each day the developed countries are pressuring one another for
a closer surveillance of their own economies. This indicates a recog-
nition of the duty. However, the developed countries continue to
deny their responsibility in the debt problem arguing that their acts
94. On the other hand, the lesser developed countries have affirmed their conviction in the
existence of a duty to share with them their huge debt burden. Their claim is based on the
assertion of co-responsibility on the part of the creditor nations. This duty has its roots in the
duty to cooperate, in the duty to supervise its own economic activities, in the duty to take into
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have no international scope or, if they have, it is impossible to prove
the relation between the acts and the injuries or damages. 95
III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWFUL ACTS APPROACH
According to the right-duty approach, the responsibility of the
acting State arises when there is a breach of an international obliga-
tion. The following discussion examines the problem from a different
approach, which assumes that there is no obligation under interna-
tional law that prescribes the duty to abstain from carrying on cer-
tain domestic acts, even if the consequences of those acts are
international in character. Instead it will examine whether there is
liability when an injury occurs, without examining the legality of the
act that caused the damage. This view is based on the fact that State
sovereignty is not unlimited and that States cannot be permitted to
harm one another with impunity even though the harm occurs as a
result of an ostensibly domestic act. The law has already been evolv-
ing toward the acceptance of responsibility for lawful acts in environ-
mental matters. Economic matters are also of extreme importance
and should be subject to similar rules regarding responsibility. This
conclusion is based on the theory of abuse of rights and on analogies
made to case law.
A. Abuse of Rights
In all legal systems, subjects have certain rights. The normal
exercise of these rights cannot give rise to responsibility on the part
of the holder. As Ripert and Boulanger state, "[i]f I have the right to
do a certain thing I am not at fault doing it, and if I have the right to
abstain from doing it, I am not at fault for failing to do it." 96
Today, the majority of the legal systems of the world accept the
theory of abuse of rights where a subject of law is liable to compen-
sate for the harm which it causes to another when it exercises its
right in an abnormal, excessive or abusive way. 97 Only England and
the United States have not recognized the independent concept of
abuse of rights, although some similar concepts are included in ac-
tions for tort, private nuisance, malicious prosecution and abuse of
95. It is true that States act according to their interests. After the United States action in
Grenada, one might ask, what place does international law occupy in the policy priorities of the
developed countries. See Joyner, The U.S. Action in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984).
96. XI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, TORTS. 105 (A. Tunc,
ed. 1983) (citing Ripert and Boulanger) [hereinafter cited as TUNC].
97. Id. at 105
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process. 98
The criteria employed to determine whether or not there has
been an abuse of rights vary. The most frequently employed factors
are: intention to harm; absence of proper interest; choice of the most
harmful way out where there was an alternative; flagrant dispropor-
tion between damage and profit; disregard of the purpose for which
the right exists; the principle of tortious fault; and improper behavior
or conduct contrary to good faith. 99 Several of these criteria will be
considered individually.
(1) "Intention to harm" is recognized in countries including
Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, Argentina and Spain."°° There has been
a change of opinion which now accepts the view that a right may be
abused without having a malicious motive. If this is true in the inter-
national context, the intention of a government when performing an
act which caused the damage would no longer be relevant. Because it
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to determine the real inten-
tion of a State, especially when the authorities have acted within their
discretionary powers, this criterion should not be used to determine
whether a State has abused its rights.
To illustrate the difficulty, the United States system of govern-
ment can be used as an example. In assessing the United States' eco-
nomic policy and attitudes toward certain economic issues, one finds
that there is no institutional process for formulation and execu-
tion.' O' It has been recognized that the Federal Reserve Board en-
couraged banks to loan to Third World countries while the F.D.I.C.
and the Comptroller of the Currency were against it.' 02 It would be
impossible, therefore, to establish what was the will of the govern-
ment since there are so many different offices, organizations, opinions
and objectives.
(2) "Absence of proper interest" is recognized by the countries
of the French legal family. According to this theory a person who
causes damages by conduct not remotely beneficial to himself is con-
sidered to have acted with the intention of causing the resulting
98. For example, private nuisance is defined as "anything that by its continuous use or
existence works annoyance, harm, inconvenience or damage to another land owner in the en-
joyment of his property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979).
99. TUNC, supra note 96, at 105.
100. Id. at 108.
101. C. FERGUSON, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 149, 158 (1978).
102. See Mixed Signals: Rival Bank Regulators Agree only to Disagree, Wall St. J., Jan. 23,
1985, at I, col. 6.
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harm.10 3 Countries of the Germanic legal family have adopted a test
of "absence of good faith" which operates in the same manner as the
French test."° Although this criterion might be valid under interna-
tional law, the burden of proof would be difficult to meet. Showing
an absence of proper interest or lack of good faith when a State is
acting on domestic matters would be very difficult. It would be unu-
sual to find a State that had acted in such bad faith that the only
purpose was to harm another State. It would be necessary to prove
that the State did not recieve any benefits from the acts, while other
States suffered damaging consequences. On balance, the evidence
needed to use this criterion is so great that it makes it unfeasible to
use it in practice.
(3) "Harmful alternative" holds that "[w]here there is a choice
between equally beneficial ways of exercising a right, its holder may
not choose the way that is harmful for others."'1 This rule of law is
widely accepted within the French and Germanic legal families and
provides a good source of international law concerning State respon-
sibility. Whenever a State can obtain, through alternative means, the
goals it is pursuing, it must choose the one which would avoid caus-
ing injuries to other States. If a State chooses to act in a manner
likely to damage other States when it would be possible to avoid the
damage without much inconvenience, the State would be liable for
the damaging consequences of the act. This criterion can be applied
clearly to economic-related matters where alternatives are usually
present.
(4) "Flagrant disproportion between damage and profit" is
widely accepted by both the German and French families."° The
rule states that if the exercise of a right tends to satisfy an interest of
minimial importance in comparison to the harm caused, then the
right has been abused. "Such disproportion reflects excessive selfish-
ness of the holder of a right and his utter disregard for the interests of
others, in conflict with the general principle that rights are to be exer-
cised according to the rules of good faith."' 1 7 This test may also be
used to determine whether a State has abused its rights in economic-
related acts. The problems in applying this test would be determin-
ing what flagrant disproportion is, what types of advantages to mea-
103. TUNC, supra note 96, at 110.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 111 (the primary exception is France itself).
107. Id.
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sure (e.g. social, economic, political), and who will measure them.'08
(5) "Disregard of the purposes for which the right exists" is ap-
plied in socialist countries. According to this rule private rights can
only be protected as long as they do not conflict with the interests of
the community.' 0 9
The countries of the Germanic legal system also apply this rule
based on the belief that rights must be exercised in good faith.' 1°
This criterion is not applicable to the effects of domestic acts in inter-
national relations because the only persons capable of determining
whether an act has fulfilled the purpose for which it was undertaken
are the nationals of the acting country.
(6) "General principles of tortious liability" indicate that, there
is an abuse of rights when the actor has done so with simple fault.
Simple fault is understood to mean "something which an ordinary
careful and prudent man does not do when exercising his rights." I I
States must act with this same due regard for the interests of others.
If a State acts and the consequence of those acts could have been
prevented by exercising reasonable care, the State is liable. The prob-
lem would again be proof of the negligence or lack of prudence, be-
cause there is no test to determine what is the prudent exercise of a
domestic right.
The best tests to determine the presence or abuse of a right are
flagrant disproportion between damage and profits and choice of the
most harmful way out where there was an alternative. The other
tests may be used but with greater difficulty.
B. Case Law Supporting This Approach
Liability for ultrahazardous activities is recognized as an emerg-
ing principle of international law." 2 The importance of this theory
108. At an international level all States must "fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed
by them." U.N. CHARTER art. 2.2. States have an obligation to promote "solutions of interna-
tional econmic, social ... and related problems." U.N. CHARTER art. 55 b. This obligation
must be achieved through both joint and separate action in cooperation with the U.N. accord-
ing to Article 56 of the Charter of Organization. If the act of a State is disproportionate that
State would be acting in bad faith because it would not be acting in accordance with the obliga-
tions assumed in the Charter of the U.N. Therefore, it would be liable and would have to pay
compensation for the injuries caused by the act.
109. TUNC, supra note 96, at 112.
110. Id. at 115.
Ill. Id. at 116.
112. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY TO
ALIENS, 35 (R. Lillich ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited at Lillich]; 1. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 50 (1983).
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lies in the fact that the damages determine the liability. The legality
of the act which caused the damages is not an issue. Generally, an
act of this type is legal in the sense that it is not prohibited.
This approach has been used in the international law arena, es-
pecially in the field of environmental issues. It has also been devel-
oped in treaties related to damage caused by space objects and
nuclear mishaps." 1
3
The International Law Commission (ILC) has been working on
the draft of what has been called "international liability for injurious
consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international
law.""' 4 The ILC has recognized the broad scope of the issue of
State responsibility for lawful acts but seems to have limited its study
to environmental matters leaving the economic issues aside.'15 How-
ever, it should be noted that within the ILC there are members that
believe that economic activities should be included in the Commis-
sion's study.' 16
The international law of State responsibility for transfrontier
pollution has been evolving during the past few years. State responsi-
bility for environmental damages has been based primarily on the
Corfu Channel Case,1 17 the Trail Smelter Award "I and the Lake La-
noux Award." 9
In the Corfu Channel Case, the International Court of Justice
addressed Albania's obligation to notify others of the existence of a
mine field in her territorial waters and said that this obligation was
based on the well-recognized principle that every State has an "obli-
gation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts con-
trary to the rights of other States."' 120 This statement embodies the
113. Lillich, supra note 112, at 35.
114. Professor Lillich's denomination: "International Liability for Lawful Acts" is pre-
ferred. Id. at 33.
115. II INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION YEARBOOK 226 (1980). The Special Rap-
porteur explained in 1980:
The Commission is not asked here to espouse new principles, or to turn conventional
exceptions into general rules; it is asked to develop existing principles of good lineage
and great generality to meet an unprecedented need. In this task it already has the
advantage of recourse to considerable State practice.
116. There was strong opposition expressed to this view, mainly by Sir Ian Sinclair, a repre-
sentative of one of the developed countries. I INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION YEARBOOK
276 (1982).
117. (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4.
118. (Can. v. U.S.) 3 U.N. REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1911 (1949). The Trail Smelter
Award is of particular importance since it was between two common law countries, Canada
and the United States.
119. (Fr. v. Spain) 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959).
120. Corfu Channel, supra note 117, at 22.
32
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1986], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol16/iss1/10
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
abuse of rights principle, the good neighbor principle and the princi-
ple of the harmless use of territory.' 2' Judge Alvarez, in his opinion
within the Corfu Channel Case, expressly asserted that the decision
was indicative of the movement of the abuse of rights theory into
international law. 12 2 This decision has now been used as a basis for
the theory of responsibility for lawful acts. '
23
In the Trail Smelter Case, fumes discharged from a Canadian
company were causing damage in the United States. Both countries
agreed to submit their dispute to a tribunal which was bound to ap-
ply "the law and practice followed in dealing with cognate questions
in the United States of America as well as international law and prac-
tice. .... ,,124 The Court of Arbitration held Canada responsible
based on a principle that "[a] State owes at all times a duty to protect
other States against injurious acts by individuals from within its
jurisdiction."'
125
This rule has been expanded to cover transfrontier pollution in-
cluding not only damages caused to neighboring States but also to
those in a wider geographical area.' 26 Nevertheless, there is still a
high degree of skepticism that the rule can be applied to water but
not air pollution issues. In fact, it has been recognized that
"[i]nternational liability as a legal instrument has been ...ineffec-
tive for obtaining compensation for damages caused by transfrontier
pollution . . 127
121. Dupuy, International Liability for Transfrntier Pollution, TRENDS IN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY AND LAW 366 (1980).
122. Corfu Channel, supra note 117, at 47.
123. Professor Brownlie is of the opinion that the basis of the assertion of Albania's respon-
sibility was the breach of a particular duty. BROWNLIE, supra note 112, at 43. He believes that
there should be no distinction between the ordinary regime of State responsibility for lawful
acts since "[i]t is the content of the relevant rules which is critical and a global distinction
between lawful and unlawful activities is useless." Id. at 50. It is evident that both positions
have good arguments.
124. Trail Smelter, supra note 118, at 1941. The controversy was between two countries
involving damage occurring in the territory of one of them and alleged to be caused by an
industry located in the territory of the other.
125. Id. at 1963. Furthermore, the award states:
No State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another neighboring State. . .when
the case is of serious consequences and the injury is established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
Id. at 1065
126. Dupuy, supra note 121, at 367.
127. Id. at 363. For a discussion of this concept and the acid rain dispute between Canada
and the United States see Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution: International Law, Agree-
ments and Other Remedies, COMMON BOUNDARY/COMMON PROBLEMS: THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 95-102 (1982).
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The Lake Lanoux tribunal resolved a dispute between Spain and
France in which Spain objected to France's use of lake waters to gen-
erate electricity because it would change the natural flow of the River
Carol which entered into Spain. The arbitral tribunal held that
France was not violating Spain's rights under the applicable treaty
which guaranteed the natural flow of the river into Spain. The tribu-
nal went on to refer to certain important issues and asserted that:
The upstream State has, according to the rules of good faith, the
obligation to take into consideration the different interests at stake,
to strive to give them all satisfactions compatible with the pursuit
of its own interests, and to demonstrate that, on this subject, it has
a real solicitude to reconcile the interests of the other riparian with
its own.'
28
This implies that the riparian State cannot abuse its rights by
harming another riparian's interests. Whenever there is an alterna-
tive which can achieve the same goal, it must choose the way that
will not harm its neighbor. If it does not it will be abusing its rights.
C Conclusion
The abuse of rights theory was recognized in the Trail Smelter
Case Award, and the Lake Lanoux Award also supported its decision
on this theory. Moreover, the International Court of Justice recog-
nized the abuse of rights principle as a "general principle of law rec-
ognized by civilized nations."' 29 The abuse of rights principle is
therefore a significant part of international law.
In the case of the Colombian debt, the domestic policies carried
on in the United States and Venezuela caused serious damage when
the interest rates were pushed up and trade decreased. If alternative
methods of managing the economy were available without pressuring
interest rates, then the United States abused its rights because it did
not take an alternative that would have caused less distress. There-
fore, the United States would be liable under international law. Simi-
larly, Venezuela might have adopted alternative measures to cope
with its economic problems in a gradual way, for example, rather
than through a single large devaluation of its currency. Under the
aforementioned principles, Colombia would be entitled to compensa-
tion or some other form of cooperation.
128. Lake Lanoux, supra note 119, at 169.
129. See HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACHTER & SMIT, supra note 81, at 79.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS
One method to attack the problems created by certain domestic
economic-related acts would be to draft a uniform law through
which individual States would recognize that certain domestic acts
may cause negative effects or damages in other States. Under this
alternative no foreign State or organization would be imposing a con-
dition on another State. Instead each State would implement mecha-
nisms to control or at least provide notice of the potentially harmful
acts on its own. The rules would provide a minimum set of require-
ments which would be recognized as compulsory at the international
level. The requirements would provide for the notification of a speci-
fied government agency whenever significant international operations
are to be conducted by individuals or corporations within its jurisdic-
tion. These agencies, in turn, will notify the potentially affected
States of the proposed activities.130 Then, the State authorities would
decide whether or not to permit the activities to be carried on. The
potentially affected State could not prevent the activity but might
then assert a claim under international law.
By establishing the legislation at a national level there would be
no problem with restriction of sovereignty. It would simply be a rec-
ognition of the international scope of certain actions.
Whenever significant action is proposed, the benefits would be
received not only by the States in which it is proposed but also by the
States which could potentially be affected. States must be reasonable;
the acts carried on by private parties in industrialized countries can
affect the economy of a lesser developed country. It is well-known
that certain multinational corporations have assets that are larger
than the whole budgets of many lesser developed countries.
It is very important to distinguish between rights and interests
in order to set up a clear observance of the States sovereignty. The
State which is going to act has a right to do so because it is acting in
matters within its jurisdiciton, and each State has the right of self-
determination and economic independence in these matters.
On the other hand, States that may be affected by these actions
only have interests at stake. They do not have a right to act. There-
fore, they can only expect that the acting State take into considera-
tion in a reasonable manner the interests of the other States. The
130. The obligation to give notice must be distinguished from that of obtaining prior agree-
ment of the other States that may be affected. Mere notice is enough in this proposal. The
obligation to give notice does not include the obligation to obtain the agreement of the State
that has been notified.
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remedy may exist when there has been an abuse of rights or a breach
of an international obligation on the part of the acting State.
31
The mechanism to be established is not going to be an easy one.
It is obvious that something has to be done to prevent, for example,
the filing of complaints or comments on a certain proposed action by
all the nations of the world. That is why the country which is pro-
posing the action or going to permit the action to be carried on
should determine which countries may have an interest. In this re-
spect, due consideration is given to the good faith with which each
country must act when deciding which other countries may be inter-
ested. The proceeding could establish a kind of invitation to com-
ment upon the proposed action within a limied time. If no formal
invitation is received, no comment would be heard from a country
which has not been invited.
The international lending to developing countries is a matter
that must be considered fundamental when taking into account the
effects of domestic policies of some countries on the economic condi-
tions of other countries. The management of domestic economic pol-
icies in some countries definitely affects the economies of the rest of
the world. These countries have to recognize their importance by
establishing, at least, an opportunity to hear the affected countries'
opinions before taking any measures.
Another feasible measure that could be adopted by the devel-
oped countries would be the establishment of maximums of indebted-
ness per country and per lender. The information could be furnished
and coordinated by the IMF which possesses it.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The lesser developed countries and particularly the Latin Amer-
ican countries are facing a difficult economic and social period. The
economic difficulties have been caused, in part, by the domestic poli-
131. For example, consider the kind of activity carried on by a sovereign State, such as
fiscal and monetary policies. The only juridical person, recognized by international law as
having jurisdiction to decide what to do in these matters, is the interested State. In certain
occasions, there are multilateral agencies at an international level which may exert some influ-
ence in these affairs, especially the IMF, but in those cases the countries have previously con-
sented to this intervention in their domestic affairs. The States that are affected by the fiscal
and monetary policies adopted by another State have interests to protect. They can do so by
requiring cooperation and due regard to their concerns, but they do not have the right to
determine the domestic policies of another State. The States most likely to be affected may
have a right, under international law, that would condemn the damaging consequences of do-
mestic lawful acts.
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cies of the developed countries. The issue this Article seeks to ad-
dress is whether States have a duty to take into account the external
effects of their domestic economic-related acts. If this duty exists
under international law what rights do the affected countries have?
Two approaches have been taken in examining this issue. Under
the right-duty approach similar duties were found to be embodied in
treaties. The duty has been recognized as custom or at least is in
process of formation. UN General Assembly Resolutions, on the
other hand, put greater emphasis on the duty to have due regard for
the interests of other States when acting. Although the duty is not
found explicitly in the traditional sources of international law, it is
clearly stated in the non-traditional sources.
The responsibility for lawful acts approach asserts State respon-
sibility for the external consequences of domestic acts, by applying
the tests used in municipal law to determine whether there has been
an abuse of rights. Whenever there is an injury caused by a foreign
State's domestic measure, there is responsibility on the part of the
acting State. This approach is more strict since it only analyzes the
result.
This overview leads to the conclusion that there are certain
rights and duties under international law which come close to the
duty this Article discusses. However, the duty to take into account
the external consequences of domestic acts is not recognized as inter-
national law by all the States of the world community. Hence, it is a
law in the process of development.
Whether the action of the States is labeled a breach of a duty or
an abuse of a right the result is the same. The important matter is
determining the content of the rule. If the right-duty approach is
compared with the abuse of rights approach, similarities can be
found that lead to the conclusion that they express the same idea.
The cases supporting the abuse of rights approach establish duties.
In this sense, the approaches come together to complement each
other.
The major obstacle to implementing this duty would be coordi-
nating the economic activities of government agencies and some in-
fluential private parties. This problem is particularly acute in the
free-market countries like the United States. The creation of an in-
ternational agreement on the matter would be the most feasible way
of achieving this control. The problem is the lack of willingness to
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The sad truth is that this developing body of international law
may be of no use at all unless enough States take interest. States tend
to act according to what best suits them and they will always be re-
luctant to accept limits by other States on their domestic interests.
Only when their own interests are at stake will States begin to take
into account the external effects of their domestic acts.
The Latin American governments have expressed their view on
numerous occasions, that the debt problem should be approached
from a political point of view. They have insisted that the solutions
must be obtained through a political dialogue that would have all the
debtor governments as a group on one side and the creditors on the
other.
The developed countries continuously defend the right to have a
democratically elected government in all the countries of the world.
They are opposed to the totalitarian regimes. History has proven,
however, that when a country is in bad economic condition and pain-
ful measures have to be taken (such as those recommended by the
IMF), it is difficult to maintain a democratically elected government.
Only totalitarian regimes are able to impose the type of measures that
the populous will not accept.
Today, the international financial framework protects the inter-
ests of lenders and causes more and more political and social unrest
in the debtor countries. With the conditions present today, the possi-
bility of governments being overthrown is greater and greater. Given
this fact it would be wiser to create a system to control the financial
flow to lesser developed countries and prevent the worsening social
and economic conditions and to improve the welfare of those
countries. '
3 2
This Article has shown how the economic policies of certain
countries directly affected Colombia's economic performance and
then examined whether Colombia can assert any type of liability on
the part of those countries. The conclusion appears to be that Co-
lombia cannot because the rule of law that establishes a duty to take
into account other countries' interests when acting domestically has
not yet been recognized as such.
132. It follows that the developed countries have a responsibility to prevent foreign influ-
ence in the determination of a country's political system. Although it could be argued that the
developed countries are breaching the right of self-determination and economic independence
when prescribing political measures indirectly through the IMF, this issue should be ap-
proached looking at the social conditions in the lesser developed countries. No matter what
type of regime they have now, the conditions must be improved. Of course, the way not to
improve the conditions is to follow the IMF's programs.
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Year Amortizations and Fees Debt Service Debt
1970 78 45 123 1,319
1971 92 53 145 1,472
1972 100 62 162 1,726
1973 133 77 210 2,022
1974 198 99 297 2,220
1975 125 117 242 2,470
1976 150 108 258 2,562
1977 182 142 324 2,779
1978 230 172 402 2,896
1979 418 231 649 3,456
1980 258 284 542 4,179
1981 266 402 668 5,168
1982 336 600 936 6,078
1983 415 565 980 6,958
1984 June 273 303 576 7,344
Source: Colombia Deuda Externa Publica y Privada 1970-1984, Banco de la Repfiblica,
Departamento de Investigaciones Econ6micas, Bogota, Colombia.
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Table No. 2
PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS OF NEWLY ACQUIRED LOANS
(Millions of Dollars)
Amount Average Amortization Average
Year Acquired Period (years) Interest Rate
1970 412 22.0 5.5
1971 395 22.0 5.6
1972 336 22.5 5.6
1973 551 18.7 7.8
1974 218 16.7 7.4
1975 383 15.2 7.5
1976 525 16.1 5.9
1977 526 15.7 5.9
1978 793 14.3 7.9
1979 1,377 13.0 9.5
1980 1,580 14.2 12.7
1981 1,664 12.9 12.1
1982 2,357 14.0 10.5
1983 1,376 14.3 11.1
1984 June 809 14.0 10.9
Source: Banco de ]a Repiiblica, Departamento de Investigaciones Econ6micas
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Table No. 3
PRIVATE EXTERNAL DEBT
AMOUNT OUTSTANDING AND SERVICE
(Millions of Dollars)
Amount
Year Outstanding Amortizations Interest Total
1970 457 59 36 95
1971 597 80 39 119
1972 642 89 47 136
1973 675 73 62 135
1974 956 88 90 178
1975 1,032 56 87 143
1976 1,143 72 102 174
1977 1,016 49 66 115
1978 1,137 64 83 147
1979 1,766 42 113 155
1980 2,121 75 195 270
1981 2,717 112 336 448
1982 3,332 94 388 482
1983 3,447 221 372 593
1984 June 3,576 89 150 239
Source: Banco de la Republica, Departamento de Investigaciones Econ6micas
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